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INTRODUCTION
At the time of this Symposium in April of 2003, controversy over the
recommendations proposed by the Secretary of Education’s Blue
Ribbon Commission on Opportunity in Athletics to revise Title IX of
* This article was originally solicited and submitted for publication as part of a
Symposium sponsored by the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy &
the Law, “Title IX: 30 Years Later,” which was held at American University,
Washington College of Law on April 2, 2003.
**Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Many
thanks to Sally Kenney and Karen O’Connor for the opportunity to present an early
draft of this paper at the 2003 Annual Fall Conference of the Association for Public
Policy Analysis and Management, and for their thoughtful comments.
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the Education Amendments of 19721 took center stage in discussions
about the law’s application to sports. The Commission’s focus from
the outset was on Title IX’s impact on men’s sports, responding to the
male sports establishment’s claim that Title IX’s “unintended
consequences” have forced cuts in men’s athletic programs.2 Not
surprisingly, given the Commission’s composition and initial
premises,3 many of its recommendations were geared toward
loosening the three-part test for measuring equality in sport
participation opportunities, thereby reducing the pressure on
educational institutions to increase women’s share of athletic
participation
opportunities.4
The
Commission’s
final
1. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972); see also “Open To All”: Title IX at Thirty,
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION’S COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS (U.S.
Department of Education, Washington, DC), Feb. 28, 2003 [hereinafter Commission
Report], available at http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/athletics/title9report.
pdf.
2. See Michael Dobie, EnTITLEment? It has Heard from the Public, Now the
Title IX Commission Faces Difficult Task of Agreeing on its Next Step, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 24, 2002, at B16 (quoting U.S. Tennis Association official as saying, “[w]e are . . .
concerned about [Title IX’s] unintended consequences”); see also Gender Equity in
College Sports: 6 Views, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 6, 2002, at B8 (quoting
Charles Neinas, former executive director of the College Football Association, as
denouncing Title IX’s “unintended consequences of reducing opportunities for
men”); Vicki Michaelis, Anthem Increasingly Her Song Too, USA TODAY, May 3,
2001, at C6 (quoting U.S. Olympic Committee official as saying, “[t]he unintended
consequences of Title IX—the decline of male sports opportunities—is very
unfortunate”).
3. See DONNA DE VARONA & JULIE FOUDY, MINORITY VIEWS ON THE REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS, 18-20 (2003) [hereinafter MINORITY
REPORT] (detailing flaws in the Commission’s process), available at
http://www.womensportsfoundation.org/binary-data/WSF.ARTICLE/pdf_file/
944.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2004).
4. Under the governing standard for measuring equal accommodation of
interests and abilities in the selection of sports, compliance is measured by the
following three-part test:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female
students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective
enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and
continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to
the developing interest and abilities of the members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate
athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program
expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the
interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and effectively
accommodated by the present program.
See Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind
Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 46-59 (2000-2001) (explaining the three-part
test in detail); see also Letter from Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for Civil
Rights, United States Department of Education Office of Civil Rights, to the Staff of
the Office of Civil Rights (July 11, 2003), available at http://www.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/title9guidanceFinal.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2004); see, e.g.,
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recommendations threatened to halt or even reverse much of the
progress toward sex equality in sports made possible by Title IX.5
Given the politics of the Bush Administration and the content of the
Commission’s recommendations, the prospect of a weakened Title IX
appeared imminent.6
For the time being, however, Title IX has emerged from the latest
controversy unscathed.
After first floating the possibility of
considering only those recommendations that received a unanimous
vote by the Commission—an inadequate concession, given that some
of the most controversial recommendations were officially listed as
unanimous despite the existence of a minority report highlighting a
flawed process that did not allow for full consideration of many of
these recommendations7—the Department of Education ultimately
decided not to make any substantive changes to the official policies
implementing and interpreting Title IX.8 For now, the administrative
push to revise and weaken Title IX and its regulations and policies has
receded.
However, it is only a break in the battle, not the end of the culture
war over Title IX. Conservative legal and political organizations
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
5. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 36-39. Some of the more
problematic provisions included recommendations that the Department consider:
revisiting the role of private funding of particular sports (Rec. 12); redefining
substantial proportionality to allow for “a reasonable variance” in male/female sport
participation opportunities relative to enrollment (Rec. 14); counting participation
opportunities to include planned available slots, rather than the actual number of
participants (Rec. 15); excluding walk-on athletes from counted participants (Rec.
17); permitting the use of interest surveys as a basis for demonstrating compliance
(Rec. 18); permitting institutions to demonstrate compliance by mirroring the
relative participation rates at other levels of sport, such as high school or youth
leagues, or the relative interests from surveys of prospective or enrolled students (Rec.
19); exempting nontraditional students from the athletics participation calculation
(Rec. 20); adopting alternative measures of compliance wholly apart from the threepart test (Rec. 23). See also The Attack on Women’s Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2003, at A20 (“The Commission’s recommendations would create enough exceptions
to significantly undermine the equality that Title IX has always stood for.”).
6. See, e.g., Diana Jean Schemo, Women’s Athletics; Female Athletes Attack
Plans to Change Title IX, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at D2 (explaining that the
Commission’s revisions “could cost female athletes nearly a million places a year in
sports programs”); Lance Pugmire, An Uneasy Step for Title IX, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2003, at D1 (quoting an aide of a top Democrat as saying that the Bush
Administration “is going after everything it perceives to have a quota attached to
it . . . . They clearly have an agenda, one that could potentially disenfranchise a lot of
people.”).
7. See MINORITY REPORT, supra note 3, at 12-18 (detailing objections to
Commission’s recommendations).
8. See Letter from Gerald Reynolds, supra note 4; see also Mike Terry, Decision
Retains Title IX Status Quo, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at D1 (stating that the purpose
of the letter was to clarify the three-part test and emphasize that all three tests have
equal weight).
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continue to place a high priority on weakening Title IX as part of
their broader political and legal agenda, and concerns about the law’s
impact on men’s sports opportunities still dominate media coverage
of Title IX.9 In the latest legal skirmish, the College Sports Council,
an organization that opposes the current interpretation of Title IX,
filed suit against the General Accounting Office, claiming that it
reported flawed data in a 2001 report citing net gains to men’s sports
in the post-Title IX era,10 and that this data was used to support the
continued application of existing Title IX standards.11 This lawsuit,
filed on the heels of the dismissal of a much more threatening lawsuit
brought by men’s sports associations against the Department of
Education challenging the legality of the Title IX regulations and the
three-part test, shows both the tenacity and increasing desperation of
the anti-Title IX agenda.12
Attacks on the three-part test will undoubtedly continue to
percolate. In a prior article, I have offered a defense of the three-part
test and the theory behind it.13 Rather than revisit the controversy
over that test, this essay will focus on three respects in which the law’s
existing conception of discrimination fails to reach far enough to
ensure girls and women equality in sports. Greater progress toward
sex equality in sports requires not just holding the line on existing
legal requirements, but further evolution in the law’s approach to
discrimination and equality guarantees. This essay will consider Title
IX’s legacy in connection with three remaining challenges to the
transformative potential of Title IX, highlighting existing
inadequacies in the prevailing legal approach. Specifically, this essay
will examine the continuing decline of women in coaching jobs and
its impact on female athleticism; the too-ready acceptance of cuts in
men’s opportunities as a remedy to discrimination against women;
and the role of cost-based justifications in preserving the status quo
sports establishment and its resistance to the kinds of restructuring
9. See Welch Suggs, Colleges Make Slight Progress Toward Gender Equity in
Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 25, 2003, at A30 (“The question of saving men’s
teams has been the hottest topic in Title IX circles since President Bush took office.”).
10. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: FOUR-YEAR
COLLEGES’ EXPERIENCES ADDING AND DISCONTINUING TEAMS (2001) (stating that the
number of men participating in intercollegiate sports increased from 220,000 to
232,000 between 1981 and 1991).
11. See In Brief, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Sept. 13, 2003, at 10C.
12. See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 02-0072, slip op. at
55-109, 116-19 (D.O.C. June 11, 2003) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge the Title IX regulations and interpretation since they failed to demonstrate
that invalidating the regulations would ensure the reinstatement or retention of any
men’s teams).
13. See Brake, supra note 4, at 13.
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that would enable further expansion of women’s sports to coexist with
the retention of men’s sports. While far from comprehensive, these
brief discussions serve to underscore three respects in which Title IX
interpretation does not go far enough toward the elimination of
institutional practices that perpetuate sex inequality in sports. Title
IX’s laudable legacy of transforming girls’ and women’s participation
in sports, rich as it is, must not eclipse the shortcomings of existing
legal interpretation and the challenges that remain.
I. TITLE IX’S LEGACY: EXPLOSIVE GROWTH IN GIRLS’ AND WOMEN’S
SPORTS PARTICIPATION, BUT DEEP-SEATED RESISTANCE TO
CHALLENGING MALE PRIVILEGE IN THE STRUCTURE OF SPORTS
Title IX’s role in furthering the explosive growth of girls’ and
women’s sports has been widely acknowledged. Compared to the
294,000 girls who participated in interscholastic athletics in 1971,
there were over 2.8 million girls who participated in interscholastic
athletics in 2002-2003.14 The number of women participating in
intercollegiate sports has gone from just below 32,000 in 1971 to over
160,000 in 2004.15 Even in recent years, with constricted budgets and
repeated claims that some institutions have cut men’s sports
opportunities, rather than increase sports opportunities for women,
the numbers of female athletes have continued to climb.16
These tremendous increases in girls’ and women’s sports
participation could not have been predicted at the time Title IX was
adopted. At congressional hearings on the Title IX regulations,
opponents of the Title IX standards charged that the creation of fullblown sports programs for girls and women would be irresponsible
given the limited interest to support them.17 Subsequent experience
with three decades of Title IX has exposed this argument as sexist and

14. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation;
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,419 (Dec. 11, 1979);
Women’s Sports Foundation, Women’s Sports & Fitness Facts and Statistics, June 1,
2004, at 14, available at http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/binarydata/WSF_ARTICLE/pdf_file/28.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
15. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation;
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,419 (Dec. 11, 1979);
Women’s Sports Foundation, supra note 14, at 15.
16. See Suggs, supra note 9, at A30-32 (noting that the number of women playing
college sports at Division I schools increased from an average of 143 in 1995-96 to 208
in 2001-02).
17. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Women’s Law Center at 29, Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2205) (quoting the testimony of a
representative of the American Football Coaches Association, stating “[t]o have equal
women’s athletic programs emerge full blown without possibly a demand for them
seems a little irresponsible”).
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short-sighted. The unprecedented growth of women’s sports in the
post-Title IX years has demonstrated the extent to which interest
depends on opportunity structures.18
The importance of the sheer numbers of girls and women now
playing competitive sports should not be understated. With more
than one out of three high school girls today competing on a school
sports team, school sports for girls have become commonplace.19
Studies have shown that girls who compete in sports not only receive a
physical benefit, but also benefit academically and socially. Girls who
play sports have higher self-esteem, less risk of depression, a lower
likelihood of engaging in high-risk behaviors, and perform better in
school than girls who do not play sports.20 The increased popularity
of, and participation in, girls’ and women’s interscholastic and
intercollegiate sports has fueled greater interest and activity in
women’s sports at all levels.21 By playing sports, girls and women gain
the opportunity to develop new relationships with their bodies, as a
source of strength and learning.22 The benefits to the girls and
women who play sports have positive spillover effects in the culture,
both within and beyond the world of sports.23
However, despite these successes, Title IX’s legacy is not one of
unmitigated success. Like other social institutions, sport has been
resilient in preserving male privilege in its deepest structures.
Professor Reva Siegel has noted the capacity of social structures to
18. See Brake, supra note 4, at 69-122 (discussing the extent to which institutional
practices shape male and female interest and experiences in sports).
19. See id. at 15-17 (documenting the growth of girls’ and women’s sports
participation in the post-Title IX era).
20. See Hannah Storm, Title IX Offers Fair Play for All, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 22,
2002, at 12 (reporting that girls who participate in sports have higher grade point
averages and SAT scores than girls who do not play sports, and that sports increases
girls’ motivation and optimism, and decreases the chances of teen pregnancy,
depression, drug abuse, and an eating disorder); see also Bonnie Erbe, Men’s College
Teams: Let’s Stop the Whining, NEWSDAY, July 22, 2003, at A26 (citing the Women’s
Sports Foundation findings from a 1989 study “showing that girls who participate in
sports are less likely to get involved with drugs, less likely to become pregnant and
more likely to graduate from high school than those who do not play sports”).
21. See Storm, supra note 20, at 12 (stating that “[h]igh profile college
programs . . . bolstered by Title IX, have led to success as in the Olympics” and have
helped create women’s professional teams).
22. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 121 (1987) (describing the potential for women’s participation in sports to
transform female bodies from objects into subjects).
23. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, Bad Girls and Good Sports: Some Reflections on
Violent Female Juvenile Delinquents, Title IX, & the Promise of Girl Power, 27
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 667, 699-701, 710-13 (2000) (documenting the varied benefits
of sports participation for girls and women, and arguing that sports participation has
the potential to help girls and women avoid high-risk behaviors by channeling
competition into a healthy outlet).
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resist challenges to inequality through a phenomenon she calls
“preservation through transformation,” in which institutions adapt to
shifts in ideology and cultural norms by avoiding overt conflicts with a
new legal and social order, while still preserving the underlying
structure of inequality.24 Professor Siegel uses as an example the legal
invalidation of Jim Crow segregation, and the subsequent
development of a discriminatory intent standard that operates to
preserve much of the underlying inequality in a manner that
comports with the modern ideology of color-blindness.25 In this
example and others, she illustrates the capacity of discriminatory
practices to change form in response to cultural and ideological shifts
while still operating to enforce social stratification.26
Likewise, in the world of sport, despite massive shifts in female
sports participation, there has been a good deal of “preservation
through transformation,” as the opportunity structures have
regrouped to preserve the central features of male privilege in sport.
For Title IX to further challenge sex bias in sports, it must extend to a
wider range of practices that preserve male privilege in the structures
of sport.
II. LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES IN SPORT: MORE WOMEN PLAY, BUT
FEWER WOMEN LEAD
The disproportionate attention paid to the alleged loss of some
male athletic opportunities in particular sports in recent years27
contrasts sharply with the relative inattention given to the one area in
which Title IX has coincided with a devastating loss of opportunity:
positions for women coaches and athletic administrators.28 In this
24. For a sampling of articles discussing this phenomenon, see Reva B. Siegel,
1998-99 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture: Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law:
How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88
CAL. L. REV. 77 (2000) (illustrating “preservation through transformation” in the
context of civil rights and domestic violence law); Reva B. Siegel, The Critical Use of
History: Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113-14, 1142 (1997) (using the
concept to point out that while a “color blind” antidiscrimination legal standard was
appropriate to battle early facial discrimination, it may not be the most appropriate
lens through which to view discrimination in today’s world); Reva B. Siegel, “The
Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2175-87
(1996) (comparing current equal protection doctrine with legal rationales for
segregation).
25. See Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 24, at 111314, 1129-48 (arguing that after Jim Crow was challenged and defeated, it was replaced
by new practices and principles such as the intent requirement that preserve much of
the prior social stratification).
26. See id. at 1142 (noting that “status enforcing state action is mutable in form”).
27. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
28. See Suggs, supra note 9, at A30 (noting that over the past thirty years, the
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area, the loss of opportunity is both severe and more clearly a byproduct of Title IX, in combination with other discrimination laws
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196429 and the Equal Pay
Act of 1963.30
The percentage of women who hold jobs coaching women college
athletes has dropped from ninety percent in 1972, to forty-four
percent in 2002, the lowest level on record.31 Recent trends suggest
that the decline in women’s share of coaching jobs in women’s sports
will not reverse itself any time soon.32 Although 361 new coaching
positions were created in women’s athletics from 2000 to 2002, more
than ninety percent of them were filled by men.33 The decline in
women’s access to jobs coaching women athletes is not offset by any
increase in women’s access to jobs coaching men; during the past
thirty years, women’s share of jobs coaching male athletes has held
steady at just below two percent.34
The gender divide in access to coaching jobs is exacerbated by pay
structures that reserve the highest coaching salaries for coaches of
men’s sports.35 Disparities in pay for the coaches of male and female
athletes have continued to increase, so that women are effectively
barred from securing the highest paid coaching jobs in college
athletics.36
Women’s share of jobs in athletics administration also has declined

number of women coaching women’s college teams has steadily shrunk and in
addition, women have not made many inroads coaching men’s teams).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2004).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2004).
31. See R. VIVIAN ACOSTA & LINDA JEAN CARPENTER, WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE
SPORT: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY—TWENTY FIVE YEAR UPDATE 1977-2002 (2002)
[hereinafter WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT], available at http://www.ncaa.org/
gender_equity/resource_materials/Historical/women_in_intercollegiate_sport.pdf
(last visited Sept. 17, 2004).
32. See id. (reporting that the decrease in number of females coaching women
has been steady in recent years: 47.4% in 1998 and 45.6% in 2000).
33. See WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT, supra note 31, at 8.
34. See id. In February 2003, Tennessee State University Athletic Director Teresa
Phillips made history as the first woman to coach a men’s Division I basketball team
when she filled in for the regular men’s coach who was serving a one-game
suspension. The specter of a woman coaching a men’s basketball team made national
news. See Jere Longman, Female Coach Wins Acceptance, if Not the Game, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at D1.
35. See Suggs, supra note 9, at A30 (reporting that the average salary for coaching
men’s sports was $81,643, while the average salary for coaches of women’s teams was
$46,382).
36. See id. (citing data showing that coaches of women’s teams made about
$3,500 more in 2001-2002 than they did in 2000-2001, but that the pay for coaches of
men’s teams increased by about $9,300).
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significantly in the post-Title IX era.37 With the merger of formerly
discrete women’s athletics programs into a unified structure
combining men’s and women’s programs, fewer leadership positions
in sports are held by women.38 Before Title IX, when women’s
athletics departments were managed separately from men’s athletics,
women held virtually all of the administrative positions for women’s
sports.39 Today, women remain tokens in leadership positions in
intercollegiate athletics.40
Existing interpretations of discrimination law effectively encourage
the dearth of women’s leadership roles in competitive sport. The law
does not recognize the underrepresentation of women in athletic
leadership roles and women’s declining share of coaching jobs as an
equality problem for female athletes. The law’s blindness, however,
does not erase the very real implications of male athletic leadership
for female athletic experience and for sex equality in sport more
broadly. By linking leadership and competence in sports with
maleness, sport’s leadership structure reinforces women’s marginal
place in sports and reinserts a risk that the empowering potential of
sports will be thwarted by gender dynamics that reinforce male
dominance.41 Inequality in sport leadership shapes the aspirations
and experiences of female athletes, reinforcing cultural and
institutional norms that devalue female athleticism.42 Sadly, many
women athletes internalize the norms linking athletic competence
with masculinity, and express preferences for male coaches.43 The
37. See WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT, supra note 31, at 2 (reporting that in
2002, “17.9% of women’s sports programs [were] directed by a female . . . .”
compared to more than 90% in 1972).
38. See Patricia A. Cain, Women, Race, and Sports: Life Before Title IX, 4 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 338, 350 (2001) (documenting the history of the NCAA
takeover of women’s intercollegiate sports and pointing to decreased levels of
women’s leadership for women’s sports).
39. See WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT, supra note 31, at 2 (highlighting that
“in 1972 more than 90% of women’s programs were directed by a female head
administrator”).
40. See id. (reporting that women hold 31.2% of the administrative job in
intercollegiate athletics, and even that number overstates women’s real power in the
athletics leadership structure, since women are more likely to be in support staff
positions rather than in policy-making positions).
41. See Rhonda Reaves, “There’s No Crying in Baseball”: Sports and the Legal
and Social Construction of Gender, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 283, 289-303, 312-14
(2001) (discussing the problem of male coaches’ sexual harassment of female athletes
and the inadequacy of existing interpretations of sexual harassment law to reach this
conduct).
42. See Brake, supra note 4, at 88-90 (discussing the importance of gender
inequality in sport leadership structures in influencing the sports participation and
interest of women athletes).
43. See id. at 88.
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internalized devaluation of feminine athleticism by women athletes
influences their own relationship to sport.44 Equally problematic is
the presumption implicit in the absence of female coaches coaching
male athletes: that women would not be respected or competent in
coaching male athletes.45 Title IX’s failure to recognize the gender
hierarchy in sport leadership as gender discrimination that affects
athletes is deeply unsatisfying.
Nor does Title IX provide a meaningful remedy for the undervaluation of women’s coaches as reflected in the enormous disparities
in coaching salaries for men’s and women’s teams.46 As more
women’s sports, and hence coaching jobs, were created in the postTitle IX years, and more money was spent on women’s programs, men
were increasingly drawn to jobs coaching female athletes, without any
compensating increase in access for women to the jobs coaching male
athletes.47 Although Title IX forced institutions to spend more
money than they had been spending on women’s sports, it did not
begin to challenge the massive divide in salaries for coaches of men’s
sports and coaches of women’s sports. The disparities in coaches’ pay
for men’s sports and women’s sports remain striking. The undercompensation of the coaches of women’s teams also shapes female
athletic experience by reinforcing the disparate valuation of men’s
and women’s athletics. Yet Title IX does next to nothing about the
disparities in coaches’ pay. Although coaches’ compensation is one
factor listed in the “equal treatment” factors for measuring equal
athletic opportunity in the Title IX regulations, female athletes may
not challenge pay disparities in coaches’ compensation unless they
prove that the lesser amount of money spent on coaches for female
athletes purchases a lower quality of coaching.48 So interpreted, the
law effectively requires female athletes to indict their coaches in order
to address pay discrimination in coaches’ salaries. Not surprisingly,
Title IX has made no headway in minimizing disparities in valuing
men’s and women’s coaches.
Not only does Title IX fail to provide a remedy for the gender
hierarchies in sport leadership, but in many respects, discrimination
law encourages the marginalization and devaluation of women in
44. See id. at 88-90.
45. See id. at 88-89.
46. See Suggs, supra note 9, at A30.
47. Cf. Reaves, supra note 41, at 312-14 (arguing that female sports adopted the
“win-at-all-costs” model of men’s sports, which retains a style of coaching that “favors
male coaches over female coaches” to the detriment of female athletes).
48. See Brake, supra note 4, at 128-29 (detailing the inadequacies in Title IX’s
application to disparities in coaches’ pay for men’s and women’s sports).
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these roles. The only law that has been even marginally successful in
addressing the pay discrimination against the coaches of women’s
teams is the Equal Pay Act, which requires institutions to pay equal
salaries to persons of the opposite sex who perform substantially
similar work. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(“EEOC”) current policy guidance on coaches’ pay makes it possible
in certain circumstances to successfully bring Equal Pay Act claims
where a man and a woman are paid different salaries to coach men’s
and women’s teams in the same sport.49 However, because the law is
only triggered when a man and a woman hold substantially similar
jobs at different levels of pay, it has the perverse incentive of
encouraging institutions to solve their Equal Pay Act problems by
hiring male coaches to coach female athletes.50 The Equal Pay Act
has no application to an institution that pays male coaches of
women’s teams less than the male coaches of men’s teams. Although
Title VII, in theory, prevents outright hiring discrimination against
women in coaching jobs, for male or female athletes, the difficulty of
proving intentional discrimination renders this prohibition easily
evaded.51
A final example of how the law preserves existing hierarchies in
sport leadership to the detriment of female athletes is in its failure to
adequately protect employees from retaliation for raising equality
issues on behalf of female athletes. In a decision remarkable for its
blindness to the equality implications for female athletes, the Eleventh
Circuit recently held in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education
that a coach who complains of Title IX violations against a women’s
team has no right to bring a private action under Title IX’s antiretaliation provision after being fired in retaliation for raising such
issues.52 The Eleventh Circuit held that because the anti-retaliation
regulatory provision exceeded the statute’s nondiscrimination
mandate, the regulations could not support a retaliation claim by
coaches or other employees.53 In failing to recognize anti-retaliation
49. See generally EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, NO. 915.002,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE COMPENSATION OF SPORTS
COACHES IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1997).
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2004) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sex between wages to any employees “at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex for equal work”).
51. See, e.g., EEOC v. Madison County United Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577,
586 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that school district’s hiring of more males to coach girls’
teams after the EEOC Equal Pay Act investigation began was not hiring
discrimination, since “efforts to bring one’s conduct into conformity with one’s
litigating posture are not evidence of willful noncompliance with the law”).
52. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002).
53. See id. at 1347-48.
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as implicit in the anti-discrimination norm, the court undercut the
rights of female athletes by denying protection to the persons who
may be best-situated (as adults and knowledgeable actors within the
athletics inner circle) to raise issues of inequality affecting female
athletes.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Jackson and is
poised to decide whether Title IX implicitly includes a private right of
action to sue for retaliation.54 In a Brief filed by the Solicitor General,
the United States has weighed in on behalf of recognizing an implied
right of action for retaliation, as have numerous other amici.55 In
light of the high stakes for Title IX enforcement, it is likely that the
Court will reject the Eleventh Circuit’s extreme ruling denying
persons protection from retaliation for asserting Title IX violations.
However, even if the Court reverses the ruling in Jackson, important
issues remain about the scope of law’s protection from retaliation. In
recent years, a number of doctrines have emerged that limit legal
protection from retaliation, and these doctrines are likely to be
imported into Title IX retaliation claims as well.56 Regardless of how
the Court decides Jackson, it is likely that coaches and other
employees will receive less than full protection from retaliation when
they raise issues about their institution’s Title IX compliance.
In addition to decreasing the chances that institutions will address
program inequalities that affect female athletes, the law’s failure to
adequately protect coaches and administrators from retaliation for
raising Title IX issues on behalf of their athletes may undercut gender
equality in sport in another respect as well. If the sociological
literature on tokenism is correct, we might expect that the women
coaches and administrators who raise Title IX concerns on behalf of

54. See 124 S.Ct. 2834 (2004).
55. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 124 S. Ct. 2834 (2004) (No. 02-1672); Brief of
the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Jackson
(No. 02-1672); Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Education Association in Support
of Petitioner, Jackson (No. 02-1672); Brief of Amicus Curiae Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights in Support of Petitioner, Jackson (No. 02-1672); Amici Curaie Brief of
Women’s Sports Foundation in Support of the Petitioner, Jackson (No. 02-1672);
Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Partnership for Women & Families and 31 Other
Organizations and Individuals in Support of Petitioner, Jackson (No. 02-1672).
56. See, e.g., Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing an
implied right of action for retaliation under Title VI, but limiting such claims to
retaliation for asserting intentional discrimination, as opposed to disparate impact,
since conduct amounting to mere disparate impact could not be “reasonably
believed” to violate the statute). For a thorough discussion and critique of doctrinal
limitations on retaliation claims, see Deborah L. Brake, Theorizing Retaliation: The
Under-Protection of Discrimination Claimants and the Preservation of the Social
Order (forthcoming) (on file with author).
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female athletes would be particularly subject to penalties, as their
female status within a male-dominated structure already marks them
as “outsiders” and trouble-makers.57 If this is true, the law’s refusal to
protect against retaliation may be particularly damaging to women in
athletic leadership, effectively encouraging institutions to punish
those women coaches and administrators who raise Title IX concerns
with impunity. The cyclical effect may be to drive more women out of
athletics leadership roles and further reinforce a culture of tokenism.
As a whole, discrimination law works to preserve a culture of male
leadership in sports that both devalues the coaches of women’s sports
and enforces a strict gender divide in coaching positions over men’s
and women’s sports. At the same time, it facilitates the
marginalization of women as leaders in sport by creating incentives to
hire men as the coaches and administrators for female athletes. And
finally, not only does the law accept the severe under-representation
of women in athletic leadership roles, it provides little protection to
the few women who are brave enough to assert the equality interests
of their female students. Despite the inadequacy, and even perverse
incentives of, discrimination law as applied to women in coaching and
athletic administration positions, no national commission has been
established to investigate the law’s “unintended consequences” for
these women, and the issue has received relatively scant media
attention, particularly in comparison to the media frenzy about Title
IX’s consequences for male athletes.58
Most problematically, none of this is recognized as an equality
problem for female athletes. By divorcing the issues facing women in
coaching and athletics administration from the experience of female
athletes and taking a piecemeal approach to discrimination, the law
fails to recognize the extent to which inequality in sport leadership
57. See Annelies Knoppers, Gender and the Coaching Profession, in WOMEN,
SPORT, AND CULTURE 119, 128-30 (Susan Birrell & Cheryl L. Cole, eds., 1990)
(discussing the implications of tokenism as it applies to women coaches and athletics
administrators).
58. For some of the more prominent recent critiques of Title IX from this
perspective, see JESSICA GAVORA, TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD: SCHOOLS, SPORTS, SEX,
AND TITLE IX (2002); John Irving, Wrestling with Title IX, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2003, at
A21; George F. Will, A Train Wreck Called Title IX, NEWSWEEK, May 27, 2002, at 82.
For surveys of arguments on both sides in the debate, see Michele Orecklin, Now
She’s Got Game: Title IX Helped More Women Get Into Sports, But Opponents
Complain Its Pushing Men Out, TIME, Mar. 3, 2003, at 53; Gender Equity in College
Sports: 6 Views, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 6, 2002, at B7-B10. See also Ellen
J. Staurowsky, Title IX and College Sport: The Long Painful Path to Compliance and
Reform, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 95, 97 (2003) (describing the Commission as “a
$700,000, taxpayer-funded, government inquiry, which fueled Title IX passions
around the country, politicized the education of children, and slowed enforcement
[and which] resulted only in a restatement of policy well-established for over twentyfive years and upheld in eight federal appellate courts”).
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affects the female athletes who play sports. Insofar as the law
preserves male privilege in sport leadership, it further marginalizes
the women who play sports. A more holistic approach would
recognize the linkage between fully valuing female athletes and fully
accepting women as leaders in sport.
III. CUTS IN MEN’S SPORTS AS A REMEDY FOR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN
A second obstacle in securing further progress under Title IX is the
current acceptance of cutting men’s sports as an adequate remedy for
discrimination against women.59 Although the claims made by Title
IX opponents of lost male athletic opportunities are grossly
overstated, it is true that some institutions have chosen to cut or cap
men’s opportunities in the so-called non-revenue sports as part of a
plan to comply with Title IX, rather than choosing the path to
compliance that adds new athletic opportunities for women.60 They
have made this choice not because Title IX requires it, but to avoid
having to squeeze the excess resources out of the most-favored men’s
sports programs (the so-called revenue producers) needed to fund
additional opportunities for women.61
Such a strategy retains the privileges for the most-favored men’s
sports while re-valuing remaining segments of the men’s sports
program as expendable. In the institutional calculation, the newly
lost male opportunities were valuable enough to warrant funding
under the old (non-equitable) gender system, but the combined value
of retaining the least-valued sport opportunities for men and adding
new ones for women does not match the greater value of preserving
the resources for the most-privileged men’s sports. Thus, new
59. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that
Brown University was in violation of Title IX’s three-part test, but rejecting district
court’s remedy requiring it to add teams for women on the ground that Brown could
comply by cutting men’s opportunities as well as by adding opportunities for women).
60. See Steven H. Biondolillo, Comply Without Cutting, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 2003,
at C9 (arguing that cutting men’s sports “has been the unimaginative and expedient
solution for scores of male athletic directors . . . whose myopic interest is in
‘protecting’ the major male (read: revenue) sports”).
61. See WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT, supra note 31, at 9 (criticizing the
practice of cutting men’s teams as a method of moving toward gender equity and
emphasizing that such a practice is not required by Title IX); see also Liz Clarke, At
Fiesta Bowl, Women Score the First Points, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2003, at A1 (quoting
Ohio State President as saying, “We shouldn’t pretend that we’re cutting back on
men’s sports because of Title IX. We’re not. We’re cutting back on men’s sports
because we have some very expensive men’s athletic programs.”); Marianne Mears,
Only Sporting to Keep Title IX Strong, HOUST. CHRON., July 21, 2003, at A18 (noting
that colleges have ways to preserve men’s wrestling and gymnastic teams by cutting
costs of football stadiums, recruiting and coaches’ salaries).
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women’s sports opportunities are not valued enough to warrant the
restructuring of athletic programs to make room for them.
This strategy effectively punishes the women who bring equality
claims by depriving them of any benefit and making them the
scapegoats for the losses of men’s teams.62 It also jeopardizes the
popularity (and survivability) of Title IX itself, as the recent
controversy over whether to abandon or substantially weaken the
three-part test demonstrates.63 By accepting cuts in men’s programs
as an adequate remedy for inequality in women’s opportunities, the
structure that privileges men’s sports opportunities is preserved, while
Title IX and the women who bring sex equality claims are framed as
the villains responsible for victimizing the male athletes who lost their
sports.64 Although such a strategy hurts the most expendable men’s
programs in the process, the decision ultimately reinforces the lower
valuation of women’s sports generally, as not worth the restructuring
it would take to add them.
The political and media emphasis on lost male opportunities
further reinforces the privileging of male sports and the devaluation
of women’s sports. The actual losses of particular men’s sports
opportunities are disproportionate to the amount of attention
devoted to this issue, thus reinforcing the differential valuation of
male and female athletes.65 Far more female athletes have been
added to college athletic programs than male athletes have been cut
in recent years.66 Even focusing exclusively on the men’s side of the
62. See, e.g., John Romano, Title IX: Evil or Equalizer?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Fla.), May 31, 2002, at 1C (quoting University of Florida associate athletic director as
saying that some universities “have chosen to cut some of their men’s sports. But it’s
been disturbing to women that they continually blame Title IX for these cuts, when
often times they haven’t managed their money very well.”).
63. For examples of how Title IX opponents attempt to use claims of lost
opportunities for male athletes to undermine Title IX, see JESSICA GAVORA, TILTING
THE PLAYING FIELD: SCHOOLS, SPORTS, SEX, AND TITLE IX (2003); George F. Will, A
Train Wreck Called Title IX, NEWSWEEK, May 27, 2002, at 82.
64. As I have argued elsewhere, such a “thin” interpretation of equality that
uncritically accepts leveling down as a remedy to discrimination is not a necessary
feature in discrimination law. My proposal would carefully scrutinize leveling down
responses to make sure that they fully remedy the expressive and relational injuries of
discrimination. See Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off:
The Leveling Down Problem in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming
2004) (on file with author).
65. See Michael Dobie, Title IX Comes of Age; Or Does It?, NEWSDAY, June 23,
2002, at C13 (“Despite the astronomical increase in women’s participation, there are
more men’s teams and men’s athletes in college overall than there were in
1972 . . . .”).
66. See Title IX, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), July 22, 2003, at 1C (citing CHRON.
OF HIGHER EDUC. survey data showing that in 2001-2002, an average of 267 male and
208 female athletes participated in athletics at a Division-I school, compared to an
average of 244 male and 143 female athletes in 1995-1996).
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equation, more male sports opportunities have been created in NCAA
athletic programs in recent years than have been cut.67 Yet, by
making lost male athletes the focal point, Title IX’s opponents force
the advocates of women’s sports into the defensive posture of having
to prove that Title IX has not hurt men’s opportunities.68 The
debate’s focus on how Title IX impacts male athletes contributes to a
construction of sport that values men’s athletic opportunities as more
important than women’s athletic opportunities, further marginalizing
women as athletes.69
In the controversy over Title IX’s fairness to male athletes, the
typical response by Title IX advocates has been to claim that any loss
of men’s sports opportunities has nothing to do with Title IX, and
that it is the product of budgetary and other considerations. This is
an accurate statement insofar as it recognizes the reality that Title IX
never forces an institution to cut men’s sports because it may always
choose to comply by adding sports for women.70 Yet, there is a sense
in which the choice to cut spaces for some male athletes, rather than
to add more sports for women, is very much about Title IX and the
grudging attitude toward sex equality that it represents.71 It reflects
the determination that opportunities that had been worth providing
67. See Suggs, supra note 9 (reporting that since 1996-1997, only thirty-eight
colleges reported dropping more than ten percent of their male athletes, while 165
reported adding more than ten percent).
68. See Maryann Hudson Harvey, Title IX Returns to Courthouse, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2002, at D3 (stating that “women’s groups that oppose reform, such as the
Women’s Sports Foundation and the National Women’s Law Center . . . contend it is
the schools’ choice to comply by dropping teams”); see also Dobie, supra note 65, at
C13 (describing Title IX supporters as claiming that “if Title IX did produce some
unintended consequences for men, that was the result of choices made by college
athletic directors, and not [Title IX] itself”).
69. See Welch Suggs, Federal Commission Discusses Possible Changes in Title IX
Enforcement, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 29, 2002, at http://chronicle.com/
prm/daily/2002/08/2002082801n.htm.
70. The Department of Education reaffirmed this most recently in a letter from
the Assistant Secretary of Education explaining the Department’s decision not to
revise Title IX in light of the recommendations from the Secretary’s Commission on
Opportunities in Athletics. See Letter from Gerald Reynolds, supra note 4
(“[N]othing in Title IX requires the cutting or reduction of teams in order to
demonstrate compliance with Title IX . . . .”).
71. The Minority Report filed in response to the report of the Secretary’s
Commission on Opportunity in Athletics recognizes as much, stating:
Numerous civil rights laws apply the principle of “equalizing up” in
authorizing remedies for discrimination—that is, raising opportunities for
the disadvantaged group, rather than diminishing them for the previously
benefited group, as a means of achieving civil rights compliance. In
providing technical assistance, the Department should advise schools of this
principle, as well as providing information on techniques other schools have
used to achieve this goal.
MINORITY REPORT, supra note 3, at 11.
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to men are not worth the added resources, or the restructuring of
existing ones, that would be necessary to provide them to women.
This determination, when made in response to claims for gender
equality or concerns about Title IX compliance, goes to the heart of
Title IX.72 A richer and more substantive understanding of equality
would set limits on when lowering the treatment of the most-favored
class, instead of improving the treatment of those hurt by inequality,
suffices to cure the inequality at issue. Title IX, and discrimination
law more generally, should take a critical stance toward leveling down
remedies to ensure that they do not exacerbate the expressive harms
and social status injuries from the very discrimination challenged.73
The law’s too-ready acceptance of such “leveling down” responses to
discrimination perpetuates a formalistic conception of equality that
risks undercutting the very values that discrimination law should
protect.
IV. FEEDING THE SPORTS MACHINE: THE ROLE OF MONEY IN
JUSTIFYING SEX DISCRIMINATION IN SPORTS
Despite Title IX’s success in opening up new opportunities for
female athletes, the extreme privileging of the most-valued men’s
sports has been entirely resistant to demands for gender equality.
Title IX has failed to make inroads in restructuring sport to provide
opportunities on an equal and sustainable basis for men and women,
and that failure jeopardizes the prospects for further progress.
Institutional strategies of cutting back men’s “minor” sports rather
than adding new sports for women are fueled by a determination to
preserve the privileged status of the most sacred men’s sports, which
continue to receive ever-increasing influxes of cash.74 The resulting
cash-crunch for women’s sports and the remaining men’s sports are
dismissed as necessary capitulations to the market and the money-

72. The Department itself came close to acknowledging this tension with Title IX,
stating: “Because the elimination of teams diminishes opportunities for students who
are interested in participating in athletics instead of enhancing opportunities for
students who have suffered from discrimination, it is contrary to the spirit of Title IX
for the government to require or encourage an institution to eliminate athletic
teams.” Letter from Gerald Reynolds, supra note 4. Yet, the Department has not
gone so far as to impose Title IX-based legal limits on the practice of leveling down
men’s opportunities in order to achieve gender balance in athletic programs, stating
merely “that the elimination of teams is a disfavored practice.” Id.
73. I develop this theory, and an argument for setting greater limits on leveling
down remedies under equality law, more fully elsewhere. See Brake, supra note 64.
74. See Suggs, supra note 9, at A31 (reporting that the average athletics budget
for institutions in the six elite bowl championship series leagues increased from
fourteen million to thirty-four million from 1996-97 to 2001-02).
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making potential of football and men’s basketball.75 Insofar as Title
IX threatens this status quo by pressuring institutions to find the
resources necessary to add women’s sports, proponents of the status
quo respond that they cannot afford to shift expenditures away from
men’s “revenue sports.” This claim amounts to an assertion that the
costs of gender equality justify abandoning, or at least cutting back on,
Title IX’s project of securing equality for girls and women in sports.
This is the central issue today in debates about Title IX’s application
to sports, and it is an issue that deserves further consideration.
The standard response from Title IX supporters has been to contest
the revenue-generation argument on its facts, questioning whether
the economies of athletic programs really justify excess expenditures
on men’s most-privileged sports. Title IX advocates contend that the
profitability of these programs is vastly overstated,76 and that net
profits, such as they are, would not suffer from cutbacks on
extravagantly excess expenditures.77 These arguments have a good
deal of merit. The profit margins of the big-time sports programs are
notoriously inflated by creative accounting procedures,78 and even
though some of these programs do bring in significant amounts of
revenue,79 the profits do not necessarily require the profligate
Many of these
expenditures lavished on these programs.80
expenditures could be reduced without jeopardizing the potential for
75. See id. at A30 (citing most recent data showing that “rising costs threaten
both the progress of women’s sports and the future of men’s sports that don’t make
any money”); see also Dobie, supra note 65, at C13 (“Generally, colleges are loath to
make any cutbacks in football because of the long-held belief that football revenues
fund the rest of the athletic program, including all those non-revenue producing
women’s and men’s minor sports.”).
76. Dobie, supra note 65, at C14, C16 (stating that in the NCAA, “58% of Division
I-A and I-AA football programs lose money, with average annual deficits of $1 million
in I-A and $630,000 in I-AA” and noting that while some Title IX advocates want to
reduce the number of football scholarships from eighty-five to seventy, college
football coaches argue, as they did when football was forced to cut back from more
than 100 scholarships, that such cutbacks would ruin the game).
77. See id. at C14, C16 (stating that Nebraska sacrificed expenditures on
swimming and gymnastics, while putting in heating coils under the grass in the
football stadium, and other institutions are known for housing players in hotels
during nights before home games).
78. See Suggs, supra note 9, at A31 (noting that some athletics departments
“count scholarships as revenue if the college itself allocates money to cover the
expense”).
79. See id. (finding that Division I-A members outside the BCS reported spending
deficits on sports while those inside the BCS reported an average profit of three
million dollars, while Divisions I-AA and I-AAA reported losing, on average, over half
a million dollars).
80. See Mark Pitsch, Todd Says He’s Shifting Course of UK Athletics, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky), Jan. 26, 2003, at C1 (stating that at the University of Kentucky,
athletic department employees were provided with cars for their jobs and the athletic
director earned more than the President of the University).
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these programs to produce revenue, especially if universities worked
together to collectively reduce costs so as to avoid risking competitive
or recruiting disadvantages relative to other schools.81
But wholly apart from its factual shortcomings, the revenue-defense
taps into deep-seated cultural understandings about sport and gender
that should be engaged in their own right. In the debate over Title
IX, claims about lost male athletes converge with cost-based
justifications for maintaining a status quo structure that leaves little
room for further expansion of women’s sports. The claim boils down
to the contention that, because men’s sports are more profitable, Title
IX should not be interpreted in a way that hinders the marketability
and profit-making potential of these sports. To the extent that the
market-based defense is accepted in this context, it raises questions
about what kinds of markets justify discrimination and what costs
institutions should have to bear in remedying discrimination. A more
general look at the role of cost in justifying discrimination will help
illuminate the relevance of cost-based arguments under Title IX.
A. Essentializing Inequality in the Body: The Convergence of the
Market Defense and Covert Assessments of a Natural Gender Order
Judicial rhetoric broadly repudiates cost-based considerations as a
legitimate defense to sex discrimination.82 Early questions about the
role of cost in discrimination law arose most prominently in a series of
cases brought under Title VII in which employers admitted
discrimination, but defended it as a necessary accommodation of
discriminatory customer preferences.
The customer-preference
defense is essentially a cost-based justification, premised on the
employer’s fear of losing market-share if it disappoints customer
expectations. In a critical test of the law’s transformative potential,
courts resoundingly rejected the customer-preference defense in
challenges to airline practices hiring female-only flight attendants.83
81. See id. (stating that only forty-eight of the 997 NCAA programs generate a
profit, and quoting a men’s gymnastics coach whose program was cut as saying that
there is an “athletic arms race” where each school tries to be the best nationally).
82. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991) (“The
extra cost of employing members of one sex . . . does not provide an affirmative Title
VII defense for a discriminatory refusal to hire members of that gender.”); City of Los
Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-18 (1978) (rejecting cost as a defense to
discrimination under Title VII); Guardian Capital Corp. v. New York State Div. of
Human Rights, 360 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938-39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), appeal dismissed, 396
N.Y.S.2d 1027 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that a restaurant could not replace male waiters
with scantily clad female waitresses, even if doing so increased its profit margins).
83. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981)
(rejecting oil company’s defense to a Title VII sex discrimination claim that Latin
American clients would refuse to deal with female executives); see also Diaz v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that customer
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These cases produced broad pronouncements that the cost of
compliance is not a defense to a discrimination claim,84 and noted
the circularity of relying on customer preference to justify
discrimination when the very discrimination challenged had
contributed to the construction of customers’ discriminatory
preferences.85
Yet, judicial rhetoric notwithstanding, discrimination law allows for
greater deference to cost-based considerations than such
pronouncements suggest. The determination of whether to place the
costs of nondiscrimination on employers depends not so much on the
extent of the costs themselves, but on situational factors affecting the
type of discrimination at issue and covert judicial attitudes about the
legitimacy of a market preference for discrimination.
The
determination of whether to impose the costs of nondiscrimination
on employers turns largely on the extent to which courts believe that
the discrimination at issue corresponds to differences in male and
female bodies. When courts believe that the gendered body is the
source of the inequality at issue, they do not place the full burdens of
nondiscrimination on employers, implicitly viewing the discrimination
as “natural” and legitimate as opposed to socially constructed and
suspect.
For example, courts tend to defer to employer accommodation of
privacy-based preferences for employees of one sex in jobs that
involve intimate bodily touching or exposure. Although the Supreme
Court has never ruled on the legitimacy of privacy-based justifications
for sex discrimination under Title VII, lower courts typically permit
employers to discriminate on the basis of sex in jobs which involve the
touching or viewing of intimate body parts.86 For example, courts are
more likely to accommodate discriminatory preferences for
employees of the same sex in jobs such as caretakers for nursing home
patients or restroom attendants than in jobs that do not involve such
preference does not validate sex discrimination because the flight attendants’ services
are not the primary function of the airline services as a whole); Wilson v. Southwest
Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 295, 302 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting airline’s claim
that its sex based hiring policy was necessary to run a successful business).
84. See Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 302 (“If an employer could justify employment
discrimination merely on the grounds that it is necessary to make a profit, Title VII
would be nullified in short order.”).
85. See id. at 303 (“Southwest exploited, indeed nurtured, the very customer
preference for females it now cites to justify discrimination against males . . . .”).
86. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 n.4 (1991)
(acknowledging that it has never addressed privacy-based justifications in sex
discrimination claims, and noting that nothing in its present opinion calls into
question lower court decisions accepting sex-based privacy concerns as a bona fide
occupational qualification for jobs that implicate privacy interests).
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bodily exposure or intimacy.87 In the former set of cases, courts make
the implicit judgment that discriminatory preferences for workers of
one sex are appropriate and worthy of deference.88
In articulating what I believe to be implicit judgments about the
naturalness of discriminatory market preferences, I do not mean to
lend legitimacy to the idea that such preferences are natural and
unconstructed. Although courts may accept as natural a preference
for workers of the same sex in jobs requiring intimate bodily
exposure, such a preference is in fact socially constructed and
culturally contingent. It is predicated on a heterosexual presumption
and a sexual norm favoring modesty, which together dictate that the
body should not be exposed to persons of the other sex. Intimate
bodily contact and exposure among persons of the same sex, on the
other hand, is presumed to be nonsexual and unlikely to induce
attraction. Even if the market preference for employees of one sex
responds to feelings of shame and vulnerability, rather than the
potential for attraction, it still rests on a heterosexual norm, reflecting
the assumption that feelings of vulnerability or inadequacy in one’s
body matter less when the body is exposed to persons of the same sex.
By treating discriminatory preferences in such cases as natural and
worthy of deference, courts relieve employers of the burden of
defying cultural norms, as if expecting employers to bear the costs of
transforming such preferences would be tantamount to expecting
them to transform male and female bodies themselves.
Judicial accommodation of discriminatory market preferences is
not confined to cases raising privacy-based objections. In other cases,
where courts attribute sex discrimination to differences in male and
female bodies, they are also more receptive to cost-based justifications.
For example, the Supreme Court’s notorious first attempt to grapple
with the bona fide occupational qualification defense in a sex
discrimination case, Dothard v. Rawlinson, upheld Alabama’s
87. See, e.g., id. at 219 n.8 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (citing lower court cases accepting privacy-based customer preferences as
a bona fide occupational qualification in job settings such as a nurse’s aid and a
washroom attendant); Local 567 Am. Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v.
Mich. Council 25, 635 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (stating that “it is clear
that in certain situations privacy rights of individuals will justify sex-based
classifications. These cases seem to involve occupations in which an employee must
work with or around individuals whose bodies are exposed in varying degrees,” and
citing cases).
88. See, e.g., Local 567, 635 F. Supp. at 1013-14 (“Obviously most people would
find it a greater intrusion of their dignity and privacy to have their naked bodies
viewed (or any number of personal services performed) by a member of the opposite
sex.”); Spragg v. Shore Care, 679 A.2d 685, 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(justifying sex-based discrimination for employees working in an environment
involving the bodily exposure of their clientele).
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exclusion of women from a maximum-security men’s prison even
though greater expenditures would have enabled the prison system to
operate safely with women as guards.89
The Court accepted
Alabama’s argument that the exclusion of women from all contact
positions working with maximum security male inmates was justified
by the risk of sexual assault to women guards, asserting that the
female plaintiff’s “very womanhood” prevented her from adequately
performing the job of securing prison safety.90 The Court thus viewed
the discrimination as biologically, rather than socially determined.
The Court relied on the unique conditions of the Alabama maximum
security facility, which failed to seclude or classify inmates on the basis
of dangerousness and type of offense, and operated under conditions
of severe overcrowding in violation of the Eighth Amendment.91
Uncontradicted evidence showed that other state prison systems that
followed general safety standards were able to effectively use women
as guards in maximum security facilities.92 However, by locating the
inequality in the female body and the rape-ability of women, the
Court was able to obscure the institutional and cultural forces that
placed women – and men – at risk of danger, and thereby naturalize
the job discrimination in question.93 Although the state could have
taken professionally accepted (and constitutionally required)
measures to lower the level of dangerousness in its facility, the Court
did not require the state to bear the cost of such measures.94
The Dothard decision has been justly and resoundingly criticized
for ignoring the obvious fact that men are also susceptible to rape in
prison and that other prison systems have managed to successfully use
women as guards in maximum-security male prisons.95 I share these
criticisms, and view the Court’s central error as locating the inequality
in women’s bodies, which enabled it to ignore the extent to which the
danger to women (and men) was socially and institutionally created.
Having focused on the body as central to the job, and the difference
in male and female bodies as central to the inequality, the Court was

89. 433 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1977).
90. Id. at 335.
91. Id. at 334-35.
92. See id. at 336 n.23 (recognizing that the conditions in Alabama’s
penitentiaries are not common and cannot be compared to those prisons safe
enough for female guards).
93. See id. at 336 (finding that the gender of the prison guard has a direct impact
on the safety of a penitentiary with existing poor conditions).
94. Id. at 334-35.
95. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1043, 1048-51 (1987) (discussing feminist criticisms of Dothard).
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primed to accept the employer’s decision to exclude women as
natural, and did not require the defendant to bear the costs of
integrating women into its workforce.
Another example of a case where judicial acceptance of sex
discrimination is driven by perceptions of the female body is
Chambers v. Omaha Girls’ Club, Inc.96 In Chambers, the employer
was an organization dedicated to providing role models for young,
adolescent women.97 When an unmarried female employee became
pregnant, the employer determined that she could no longer serve as
an adequate role model for young women. Although the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act defines discrimination on the basis of sex to
include pregnancy, the court accepted the employer’s defense,
finding that the unmarried pregnant employee could not perform
her job because her pregnancy undermined her ability to serve as a
role model.98 As in Dothard, the source of the inequality was
grounded in the female body, this time, the pregnant female body.
The discrimination was viewed as corresponding to the natural
meaning of the pregnant body, a meaning indicative of licentiousness
and promiscuity, and incompatible with positive values. The court
treated the meaning of the pregnant body and its capacity to mentor
young women as fixed, without questioning the cultural and
institutional practices that assigned it that meaning.
Having
grounded job performance in the body, the court was not inclined to
require the defendant to undertake efforts toward cultural
transformation that might challenge the social meaning of pregnancy
and enable an unmarried pregnant woman to serve as a positive role
model.
Sometimes covert assessments of the naturalness of discrimination
occur at the level of denying that discrimination exists, rather than
evaluating customer- or client-based defenses to the discrimination.
For example, judicial acceptance of employer sex-based dress codes
and appearance standards stands out as an exception to the general
rule that sex-based different treatment is invalid unless justified by a
bona fide occupational qualification.99 Title VII challenges to sexbased dress codes and standards of appearance rarely succeed, as long
as the dress and grooming standards conform to community norms

96. 834 F.2d 697, 703-04 (8th Cir. 1987).
97. See id. at 699 (maintaining that the purpose of the role model approach was
for the girls to emulate the role models’ behavior and actions).
98. Id. at 702-03.
99. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1976) (upholding hairgrooming standards as applicable to male members of the police force).
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and professional expectations, however gendered.100 Generally,
discrimination against individuals on the basis of sex is cognizable as
discrimination, even if symmetrical constraints may be placed on
persons of the other sex.101 However, in the dress code cases, courts
typically refuse to see the “discrimination” at all, as long as both men
and women are prohibited from “crossing over” to the gender
presentation deemed suitable for the other sex. These cases reflect an
implicit judgment that employers should not be forced to bear the
costs of challenging certain cultural expectations about gender.
The dress code cases, much like Dothard, Chambers, and the
privacy cases, reflect an underlying, unarticulated judgment that the
body is central to the employment practice in question, and that the
different treatment corresponds to differences in male and female
bodies. Together, when read in context with the courts’ general
rejection of customer preference as a defense to discrimination, these
cases reflect an implicit determination about when employers should
have to bear the costs of nondiscrimination and when they should
not. The dividing line turns on implicit judgments about the
“naturalness” of the gendered order confronted by discrimination
law. The willingness of courts to place such costs on airlines that
capitulate to cultural preferences for sexy and nurturing female flight
attendants is juxtaposed with a reluctance to place such costs on
employers who conform to gendered expectations for appearance.
The difference in the two contexts reflects an implicit judgment that
the preference in the former type of case is constructed, undeserving
of accommodation, while the preference in the latter situation is
natural and grounded in the body.
It is not that the body does not exist in cases like the airline
litigation rejecting the market-based justification, but that courts see
the interjection of sex difference stemming from the body as extrinsic
to the flight attendant’s job.102 Having inserted the sexualized female
body in a setting where it does not belong, the employer must bear
the costs of cultural transformation in defying the customer

100. See, e.g., Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987);
Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1985); Willingham v.
Macon Pub’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
101. See, e.g., Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708 (judging discrimination at the level of the
individual, without regard to absence of disparate burden on women as a group);
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982) (rejecting employer’s argument that
the bottomline treatment of African Americans as a group effectively countered any
discriminatory impact of the employer’s test on African American individuals).
102. See Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 302 (explaining that “being female is not a
qualification required to perform successfully the jobs of flight attendant and ticket
agent”).
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preference for a female-gendered body. The customer preference in
that case strikes courts as prejudicial, not natural. In part, this reflects
a covert determination to keep the gendered or sexualized body out
of work settings where it does not belong.103 In workplaces that are
already highly sexualized, in which sex is the commodity sold, the
body’s presence is undeniable and customer preferences for the
sexualized female body is a legitimate discrimination against male
employees.104
While courts do not explain their decisions in terms of the
perceived naturalness of the existing gender order (although Dothard
comes close), judicial determinations about when to saddle
defendants with the costs of nondiscrimination often correspond to
conventional and deeply held notions of “real differences” grounded
in male and female bodies. Broad judicial statements dismissing costbased justifications must be read in light of those cases in which courts
shy away from placing the costs of nondiscrimination on defendant
institutions. Courts typically accede to market preferences for
discrimination in cases where the body is perceived as central to the
job and the source of the inequality.105 In such settings, the
acquiescence in discriminatory market preferences reflects the
judgment that, although discrimination law generally requires
defendants to bear the costs of nondiscrimination, it does not require
them to defy fundamental differences in male and female bodies and
how people respond to them.
B. The Role of the Market in Justifying Sex Discrimination in Sports
Returning to the use of market justifications for the status quo in
sports, I believe that a similar kind of covert assessment about the
naturalness of sex inequality in sports is at work in this setting. In the
late nineteenth and even early- to mid-twentieth centuries,
justifications for the exclusion of women from sports were expressly
103. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 196 (2004) (discussing and
defending the distinction in Title VII case law between employers who operate a
highly sexualized workplace where sex is the commodity sold and are permitted to
use sex as a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”), from employers seeking
to insert sex appeal into the non-sexual product or service sold, who typically are
prohibited from using sex as a BFOQ).
104. See, e.g., Guardian Capital Corp. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 360
N.Y.S.2d 937, 939-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (Reynolds, J., concurring), appeal
dismissed, 369 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (N.Y. 1975) (citing and discussing a case upholding sex
as a BFOQ in the highly sexualized job of a Playboy Bunny).
105. But see Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 301 (stating that sex-linked aspects of a job
must predominate over sex-neutral aspects in order for an employer to discriminate
based on gender as a BFOQ).
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grounded in the female body and fears that participation in sports
would interfere with female reproductive functions.106
Today,
explicit reference to the distinctiveness of female bodies as a rationale
for inequalities in providing sport opportunities to women is no
longer generally accepted. As more and more girls and women have
participated in sports, it has become implausible to perceive women’s
bodies as incompatible with sports. However, implicit judgments
about differences in male and female athletic bodies continue to
shape arguments and justifications for continued inequality in sports
opportunities.
Title IX takes an ambivalent stance with respect to the role of cost
in a discrimination analysis. On the one hand, cost has not succeeded
as a defense to discrimination claims under the three-part test for
measuring participation opportunities.107 However, in applying that
test, courts have permitted institutions to cut minor men’s sports as a
means of compliance, rather than requiring the reshaping of athletic
programs to retain existing programs at a sustainable level of funding
while adding new opportunities for women.108
The typical
justification proferred by an institution for refusing to expand
opportunities for women as the chosen method for Title IX
compliance is cost—that the institution can not afford to reallocate
resources away from its richest men’s teams.
Title IX law intersects with cost-based justifications of inequality at
another level as well. Although courts interpreting Title IX have
steadfastly proclaimed that cost is not a defense to discrimination, in
some respects, the very selection of the three-part test as the measure
of discrimination represents a capitulation to cost-based concerns.
When the three-part test was established in 1979 as the measure for
equal opportunity to participate in sports, it was chosen over other
possible measures of equality.109 One alternative conception of
106. See CHRISTINE LUNARDINI, WHAT EVERY AMERICAN SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
WOMEN’S HISTORY: 200 EVENTS THAT SHAPED OUR DESTINY 328 (1997) (describing latenineteenth and early-twentieth century prohibitions on female athleticism, based on
beliefs that women were inherently fragile and that physical activity was detrimental to
their health).
107. See, e.g., Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D. Colo.
1993) (determining that defendants violated Title IX by eliminating the women’s
softball team to reduce the athletic department’s costs), aff’d, 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.
1993); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 580, 583 (W.D. Pa. 1993)
(concluding that the University could not cut women’s athletic teams even during a
budget crisis); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 750-58 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)
(holding that the University could not reject the women’s ice hockey team’s
application for varsity status on the basis of financial concerns); Haffer v. Temple
Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
108. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898-99 n.15 (1st Cir. 1993).
109. See, e.g., Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy
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equality might have allocated equal amounts of money to men’s and
women’s sports programs and permitted male and female students to
use the money to purchase the kinds of sports that best fit their
interests. In many respects, such a simple measure of equality would
make more sense than the current three-part test, which measures
opportunity based on actual participation and assumes, under prong
three, that interest and ability to play varsity sports comes from the
existing student body, rather than through recruitment. However,
equal funding for men’s and women’s sports was not chosen as a
measure of equality, on either a per capita or absolute basis, because
of the expectation that certain men’s sports would cost more than
women’s sports.110 Title IX’s failure to require equal resources to be
spent on men’s and women’s sports is itself a capitulation to costs
based on a customer preference rationale.
Finally, market considerations may shape the ultimate resolution of
the ongoing controversy over how Title IX should define
discrimination in sports. To a large extent, the attack on the threepart test rests on the premise that universities should not be required
to cut back expenses for their most profitable men’s sports in order to
add sports for women, and that the only option left, cutting back on
men’s minor sports, is also unpalatable. Thus, market considerations
may affect how discrimination itself is conceptualized in this area. As
with the dress code cases, beliefs about the naturalness of sex
difference are likely to play a role here as well. For example, in a
recent essay, Professor Gary Roberts argues for balancing gender
equality, economics, and the interests of elite student athletes aspiring
to professional sports careers in framing an equitable solution to the
Title IX controversy.111 He recommends a set of proposals that
would, inter alia, set some constraints on expenditures by institutions
while at the same time accommodating, to some extent, the financial
realities of institutions seeking to maximize football and men’s
basketball revenues. His willingness to make some accommodation
Interpretation; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,420
(Dec. 11, 1979) (explaining the agency’s decision to reject a previously proposed
average per capita expenditures test in response to opposition in the notice and
comment period). The agency apparently did not seriously consider proposing an
average per capita expenditures test that used enrollment, as opposed to sports
participation, as a benchmark for measuring expenditures. Id.
110. See id. at 71421 (recognizing “characteristics common to most revenue
producing sports that could result in legitimate non-discriminatory differences in per
capita expenditures,” and noting, for example, that “some ‘revenue producing’ sports
require expensive protective equipment and most require high expenditures for the
management of events attended by large numbers of people”).
111. See Gary R. Roberts, Evaluating Gender Equity Within the Framework of
Intercollegiate Athletics’ Conflicting Value Systems, 77 TULANE L. REV. 997 (2003).
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for the business aspects of sports appears integrally related to his
ambivalence about whether disparities in opportunities in this area
really amount to “discrimination.” He cites the unique context of
sports, and its allowance for sex-separation, as casting doubt on the
applicability of traditional concepts of “discrimination.” His view
about the limits of “discrimination” is shaped by an understanding of
the naturalness of gender difference in sports, and he reads Title IX’s
accommodation of sex difference through the separation of sports
programs as affirming this understanding.112 By locating male and
female bodies as the source of remaining inequality in sports, this
account leaves the concept of discrimination itself suspect as applied
to women in sports, leaving more room for cost-based considerations
to play a role.113
Although conventional notions of difference in male and female
bodies are no longer used to justify the exclusion of women from
sports entirely, they still form the subtext for the law’s receptivity to
market preferences as a justification for the status quo. The revenue
rationale for retaining the status quo in sports draws on deeply
ingrained beliefs about differences in men’s and women’s bodies. It
assumes that the preference for watching men’s sports is natural,
rather than socially or institutionally constructed. Such implicit
judgments are apparent, for example, in discussions about whether
women’s basketball will ever draw the kinds of crowds that now flock
to the men’s games. Those who answer in the negative often cite
men’s greater speed and height, which facilitate dunking, thus
grounding the difference in spectatorship in the differences in male
and female bodies. When Title IX’s critics raise the revenue
argument, they remind women that their sports make less money and
that while women may play sports, they don’t play them the way men

112. See id. at 1016 n.4 (noting a “complication to the concept of equal
opportunity” in sports in that “[i]t is only in the context of gender in athletics that
modern society accepts the principle of ‘separate but equal,’” and concluding “that
there is something very different about men and women when it comes to sports that
requires that we not use simple slogans or notions of ‘equality’ in considering the
gender-equity issue”).
113. Although Professor Roberts is correct that Title IX’s approach to
discrimination in athletics does not fit easily within the law’s typical formal equality or
liberal framework, he does not consider other theoretical approaches that better
support Title IX’s definition of discrimination. See Brake, supra note 4, at 47-50
(using feminist theory to explain and defend the three-part test as a tool for
challenging institutional structures and cultures that construct male and female
sports interests); see also Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title
IX’s Sex-Based Proportionality Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions
Defensible?, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731 (2003) (defending Title IX’s three-part test under
a “tool-giving” distributional model of equality and a model of equality that promotes
widely shared perfectionist values).
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do or generate the same return for them. The appeal to money in
this way taps into lingering beliefs about natural differences between
male and female bodies and how those differences define their
participation in sports. In such discussions, the extent to which
spectatorship has been shaped and constrained by societal
expectations and institutional investments is obscured.
In fact, nothing about sports as played in today’s educational
institutions is “natural”—not even what counts as a “sport.” The
popularity and revenue-producing potential of a sport is certainly not
natural; it is carefully promoted and nurtured by the machinery of
college (and professional) athletics. It is a product of countless social
and institutional factors, including longstanding and continuing
investments in facilities, personnel, programs, recruiting, marketing,
and coaching, just to name a few. These investments contribute to a
certain image and status of a sport that greatly affect its marketability.
The existence of average differences in male and female bodies in
height and upper body strength does not “naturally” translate into
inequality in markets and spectatorship.114 In a different sports
culture, shaped by different institutional practices, for example,
women’s basketball, with its emphasis on passing, teamwork, and
communication might be more highly valued and watched than a
dunking match between superstars. To the extent that appeals to
market justifications succeed in this context, they do so because they
tap into deeply held and little-examined beliefs that locate sex
inequality in sports in male and female bodies.
It is not yet clear whether discrimination law will require institutions
to participate in the cultural reconstruction of gender norms in
sports, in the same way that it has required the airlines to do in
refusing to accommodate discriminatory preferences for female flight
attendants, or whether it will shirk from placing the full costs of
nondiscrimination on these institutions. To the extent that cost-based
considerations have succeeded in legitimating the status quo in sports,
it is because they still resonate with cultural beliefs about the natural
inequality of male and female bodies in sports. Courts tend to
equivocate in placing the costs of nondiscrimination on defendants in
settings where the body is situated as a prominent site of struggle.
Although courts no longer justify discrimination against women in
terms of “nature herself” and the “functions of womanhood,”115 there

114. See generally COLETTE DOWLING, THE FRAILTY MYTH (2000) (arguing that even
average differences in athletic performance are attributed to culture and not
biology).
115. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
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is still a tendency to essentialize sex inequality in the body, obscuring
its societal and institutional origins.
CONCLUSION
With seemingly endless attacks on Title IX’s three-part test in
recent years, supporters of Title IX have been consumed by efforts to
defend and celebrate the gains in women’s sports participation that
Title IX has enabled. There has been little attention by legal scholars
to the ways in which Title IX’s legacy has fallen short of its feminist
promise. This article begins to fill this gap. Further developments in
Title IX law along the lines discussed here will require changes in the
culture and society in which girls and women play sports. Shifting
cultural understandings of gender and sports already have played a
key role in fending off the recent challenge to Title IX posed by the
Secretary’s Commission on Athletics.116 But while mainstream
culture now accepts girls and women as athletes, it does not yet accept
them as equally valuable players and participants. The social
constructionist understanding of sex inequality in sports has not yet
infiltrated to the level necessary to challenge the deepest structures of
bias in sports.

116. See Letter from Gerald Reynolds, supra note 4 (stating that “[a]fter eight
months of discussion and an extensive and inclusive fact-finding process, the
Commission found very broad support throughout the country for the goals and
spirit of Title IX”).
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